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Property and Speech 
Robert A. Sedler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article analyzes the impact of the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of freedom of speech on the use, enjoyment and control of 
property. The Article analyzes this impact with reference to “The 
First Amendment as Sword” and “The First Amendment as Shield.” 
In “The First Amendment as Sword,” the Article discusses how 
the First Amendment has been asserted to interfere with a property 
owner’s use or control of tangible property and to limit the protection 
of an owner’s property interests. The following areas will be covered: 
(1) Picketing and Protests; (2) Boycotts; (3) Governmental Economic 
Regulation; (4) Home Solicitation; (5) “Fair Use” and Copyright 
Protection; and (6) Access to Public Property. 
In “The First Amendment as Shield,” the Article discusses how 
the First Amendment has been asserted to invalidate or limit 
otherwise permissible government regulation of property ownership 
or use by enterprises engaged in the “business of expression.” The 
following areas will be covered: (1) Regulation of Sexually-Oriented 
Entertainment; (2) Licensing of the Business of Expression; (3) 
Billboard and Sign Regulation; (4) Illegal Conduct and the Business 
of Expression; (5) Regulation of Newspapers and Publishers; and (6) 
Regulation of Broadcasting, Cable and the Internet. 
The Article concludes, not surprisingly, that the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression has a very 
significant impact on the use, enjoyment and control of property. The 
First Amendment operates as a sword to enable persons engaged in 
expressive activity to interfere with an owner’s use or control of 
 
 * Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. (1956); J.D. (1959), 
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tangible property and to avoid liability for interference with an 
owner’s property interests. The First Amendment also operates as a 
shield to invalidate or limit otherwise permissible regulation of 
property use and business operations by enterprises engaged in the 
“business of expression.” 
This result should not be surprising in light of the function of the 
First Amendment in the American constitutional system. The 
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
freedom of expression very expansively, and the constitutional 
protection afforded to freedom of expression is perhaps the strongest 
afforded to any individual right under the Constitution. It is also fair 
to say that the constitutional protection afforded to freedom of 
expression in the United States is seemingly unparalleled by other 
constitutional systems, and that, as a constitutional matter, the value 
of freedom of expression prevails over other democratic values, such 
as equality and privacy.1 
The strong constitutional protection afforded to freedom of 
expression is reflected in what this Article calls “the law of the First 
Amendment.”2 The “law of the First Amendment” consists, in large 
part, of concepts, principles and specific doctrines that the Supreme 
Court has developed over the years in the process of deciding First 
Amendment cases. These concepts, principles, and doctrines are 
supplemented by a residual balancing approach, which, to a degree, 
consists of subsidiary doctrines that have resulted from the Court’s 
precedents dealing with particular kinds of interferences with 
freedom of expression. The components of the “law of the First 
 
 1. Similarly, the First Amendment provides greater protection to freedom of expression 
than is generally provided under international human rights norms. For example, Article 20 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires that “[a]ny propaganda for 
war” and “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence” be “prohibited by law.” See International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), ¶ 20, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976). Because “war propaganda” and “hate 
speech” are, in most circumstances, protected by the First Amendment, when the Senate ratified 
the ICCPR, the resolution of ratification contained a reservation to the effect that “Article 20 
does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict 
the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.” 138 CONG. REC. § 4781–01 (1992). 
 2. See generally Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment in Litigation: The “Law of the 
First Amendment,” 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 457 (1991). 
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Amendment,” then, are concepts, principles, specific doctrines, and 
what may be called “balancing/subsidiary doctrines.”  
In practice, the constitutional protection of freedom of expression 
is very much a matter of identification and application. In many 
cases, once the appropriate concept, principle, specific doctrine or 
“balancing/subsidiary” doctrine has been identified and applied, the 
parameters for the resolution of the First Amendment issue are 
established and the result is often fairly clear. To this extent, the “law 
of the First Amendment” may be considered settled. While a large 
number of First Amendment cases arise in practice and some come 
before the Supreme Court every term, these cases will be resolved 
under the “law of the First Amendment.”3 
The development of the “law of the First Amendment” and its 
application to questions of property and speech has continued on the 
same course throughout the years of the Rehnquist Court. It is this 
Article’s submission that, in the area of the First Amendment, the so-
called “liberal-conservative” divisions that may appear in other areas 
are generally absent. The Court as an institution has demonstrated a 
strong commitment to the constitutional protection of freedom of 
expression. The differences that may appear among members of the 
Court in First Amendment cases are generally non-ideological, and 
usually involve simply a disagreement over the application of the 
“law of the First Amendment” to specific situations. With this 
introduction, the Article now turns to “The First Amendment as 
Sword” and “The First Amendment as Shield.” 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS SWORD 
Here we will discuss how the First Amendment has been asserted 
by those engaged in expressive activities to interfere with a property 
owner’s use or control of tangible property and to limit the protection 
of the owner’s property interests. 
 
 3. For an update of the “Law of the First Amendment,” see Robert A. Sedler, The Settled 
Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 173, 283–325 
(2002). 
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A. Picketing and Protests 
It has long been recognized that picketing is a form of protected 
speech under the First Amendment.4 Public streets and sidewalks in 
front of a home or place of business are public forums. The First 
Amendment guarantees access to a public forum for purposes of 
expression, and a state can regulate such access only by content-
neutral and reasonable time, place and manner limitations.5 In order 
for a particular regulation to be sustained as a reasonable time, place 
and manner regulation, it must serve a significant governmental 
interest and it must leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.6 This means that, as a general proposition, protestors 
have a First Amendment right to interfere with a person’s use and 
enjoyment of property by picketing and protesting in front of his or 
her home or business. Early cases involved protests against racial 
discrimination, such as picketing in front of the home of a city mayor 
to protest school segregation,7 and distribution of leaflets accusing a 
real estate broker of engaging in “blockbusting.”8 More recent cases 
involved protests against abortion, such as picketing in front of the 
home of a doctor who performs abortions9 or protesting in front of 
 
 4. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). The early cases involved picketing in 
connection with a labor dispute, and the scope of permissible labor picketing is governed by 
federal and state labor relations law. 
 5. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
 6. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
 7. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969). 
 8. See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). 
 9. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). In Frisby, in response to picketing by anti-
abortion protestors in front of the home of a doctor who performed abortions, a city enacted an 
ordinance that, by its terms, prohibited “engag[ing] in picketing before or about the residence or 
dwelling of any individual.” Id. at 474. The Court gave the law a narrow construction, so as to 
be limited to “focused picketing” directed at a particular residence. Id. As narrowed, the law did 
not reach walking through residential neighborhoods or even walking a route in front of an 
entire block of houses. Thus, the law advanced the asserted interest in promoting residential 
privacy without substantially interfering with the protestors’ ability to convey their message to 
the general public and to the doctor who was the target of their protest, and therefore could be 
upheld as a reasonable time, place and manner limitation.  
 In Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994), the Court held an injunction 
creating a 300-foot buffer zone around the homes of persons who worked in an abortion clinic 
to be violative of the First Amendment. The Court noted that the zone surrounding the 
residences was much larger than that approved in Frisby, and that a limitation on the time and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/7
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abortion clinics. In these cases, the First Amendment issue was 
whether a particular restriction on the protests could be upheld as a 
reasonable time, place and manner limitation. The Court held 
unconstitutional an injunction ordering anti-abortion protestors to 
refrain from attempting to “counsel women entering abortion clinics 
who indicated that they did not wish to be ‘counseled.’”10 It upheld 
provisions of an injunction establishing a thirty-six-foot buffer zone 
around the entrances to an abortion clinic, but struck down provisions 
prohibiting anti-abortion protestors from making uninvited 
approaches to women seeking to enter the clinic and from displaying 
“observable images” of aborted fetuses and the like.11 In its latest 
pronouncement on the subject, the Court upheld a state law 
prohibiting anti-abortion protestors within 100 feet of an abortion 
clinic from coming within eight feet of a person going to the clinic 
without that person’s consent to persuade her not to have an 
abortion.12 
It should be emphasized that interference by picketing and 
protests with the use and enjoyment of property is possible only 
because the picketing and protests take place on adjacent public 
streets and sidewalks. Because the adjacent public streets and 
sidewalks constitute a public forum for First Amendment purposes, 
the picketers and protestors have a right of access therein, and the 
state can restrict the picketing and protests only by reasonable time, 
place and manner limitations. However, the picketing and protests 
would lose their First Amendment protection if they carried over onto 
privately owned property because the protestors would then be 
engaging in an illegal trespass, and conduct that is otherwise illegal 
does not become any less so when it is carried on for purposes of 
expression.13 
 
duration of picketing and on the number of pickets outside a smaller zone would advance the 
asserted interest in protecting residential privacy. Id. at 775. 
 10. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 11. Madsen, 512 U.S. 753. 
 12. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 13. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. Boycotts 
The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of association 
protects the right to organize boycotts of businesses and products to 
advance political objectives.14 A boycott directly interferes with 
property rights by urging people to refrain from dealing with 
businesses that are the target of the boycott and to refrain from 
purchasing the boycotted products. State tort laws impose liability for 
wrongful interference with business interests, but those engaged in 
boycotts to achieve political objectives have successfully asserted the 
First Amendment as a bar to the imposition of liability under these 
laws. The leading case on this issue is NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co.15 In 1966, African-American residents of a Mississippi 
city, led by the NAACP, organized a boycott of white-owned 
businesses in the city as a means of pressuring the businesses to hire 
African-American employees and the city and county governments to 
take actions such as desegregating the public schools and public 
facilities, hiring African-American police officers, making 
improvements in African-American residential areas, selecting 
African-Americans for jury duty, and ending the abusive treatment of 
African-Americans by police officers and government officials.16 
Although some incidents of violence took place in connection with 
the boycott, the boycott was, for the most part, peaceful, and it took 
the form of speeches and non-violent picketing urging African-
American residents not to patronize the boycotted businesses.17 The 
state supreme court imposed liability against the NAACP for all 
losses to the businesses caused by the boycott and enjoined the 
boycott’s continuation.18 
The United States Supreme Court reversed.19 It held that the First 
Amendment precluded the state from imposing liability for the 
boycott, except as to specific harm proven to have been caused by 
 
 14. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 898–900. 
 17. Id. at 903. 
 18. Id. at 894–96. 
 19. Id. at 934. 
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acts of violence.20 The Court noted that “[t]he black citizens named 
as defendants in this action banded together and collectively 
expressed their dissatisfaction with a social structure that had denied 
them rights to equal treatment and respect,”21 and that, “‘the practice 
of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a 
common end is deeply embedded in the American political 
process.’”22 The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of 
association, said the Court, protects “‘the right of the people to make 
their voices heard on public issues,’”23 and “[e]ffective advocacy of 
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial 
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.”24 The Court 
concluded that “[t]he right of the States to regulate economic activity 
could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, 
politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and 
economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution itself.”25 
The effect of Claiborne Hardware was to fully legitimatize and 
protect the use of the boycott to achieve political objectives despite 
its interference with the property rights of the targets of the boycott. 
This means that the Southern Baptist Convention can organize a 
boycott of Walt Disney theme parks to protest the company’s policy 
of providing benefits to same-sex partners of employees.26 This also 
means that groups can organize boycotts against the sponsors of 
television programs that feature sex and violence, or against the 
products of American companies that are produced abroad under 
substandard labor conditions. 
 
 20. Id. at 933–34. 
 21. Id. at 907. 
 22. Id. (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 
(1981)). 
 23. Id. at 908. 
 24. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). 
 25. Id. at 914. 
 26. The boycott began in 1997 and was joined by other conservative Christian groups. See 
Lori Sharn, Southern Baptists May Boycott Disney, USA TODAY, June 16, 1997, at 9A. It ended 
in 2005, with the Southern Baptist Convention saying that “[t]he boycott has communicated 
effectively our displeasure concerning products and policies that violate moral righteousness 
and traditional family values.” Baptists End Disney Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at A17. 
Disney did not change its policy, and the boycott did not appear to have a significant financial 
impact on Disney’s operations. 
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C. Governmental Economic Regulation 
The First Amendment also has some impact on governmental 
economic regulation, in that regulatory statutes have been construed 
by the Court to not reach certain expressive activities. While 
Congress may prohibit secondary boycotts by labor unions as part of 
its “striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of 
expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and 
consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial 
strife,”27 this prohibition has been construed to not prohibit the 
picketing of a secondary employer that is confined to persuading 
customers to cease buying the product of the primary employer.28 
Similarly, under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,29 there is immunity 
from antitrust liability for concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize 
trade by utilizing the First Amendment’s right of petition for redress 
of grievances. In Noerr, an association of railroads engaged a public 
relations firm to conduct a publicity campaign against the trucking 
industry, which, according to the antitrust complaint of the truckers, 
was “designed to foster the adoption and retention of laws and law 
enforcement practices destructive of the trucking business, to create 
an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers among the general public, 
and to impair the relationships existing between the truckers and their 
customers.”30 The truckers alleged that the sole motive for the 
campaign “was the desire on the part of the railroads to injure the 
 
 27. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees 
Union, 447 U.S. 607, 617–18 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
result)). 
 28. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58 (1964). It should 
also be noted that section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) 
(2000), does not by its terms prohibit “publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of 
truthfully advising the public . . . that a product or products are produced by an employer with 
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer.” 
But see Retail Store, 447 U.S. at 617–18 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
result). In Retail Store, the Court held that the prohibition on secondary boycotts does extend to 
a union’s picketing of title companies that sold the insurance policies of the insurance 
underwriter with whom the union had a labor dispute. Id. The Court concluded that because the 
title companies derived much of their revenue from the sale of the underwriter’s policies, the 
effect of the picketing could amount to a boycott of the title companies themselves. Id. 
 29. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 30. Noerr Motor, 365 U.S. at 129. 
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truckers and eventually to destroy them as competitors in the long-
distance freight business.”31 The complaint also alleged specific 
instances in which the railroads attempted to influence legislation by 
means of their publicity campaign, for example, that they persuaded 
the Governor of Pennsylvania to veto a law that would have 
permitted truckers to carry heavier loads over Pennsylvania roads.32 
The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to the 
activities of the railroads.33 The Court noted that the Sherman Act 
does not apply to state action, and therefore it also should not prohibit 
“two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to 
persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with 
respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly.”34 The 
Court went on to discuss the importance of the constitutional right to 
petition, stating that “[i]n a representative democracy such as this, 
these branches of government act on behalf of the people and, to a 
very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon 
the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their 
representatives.”35 
Concluding that “[t]he right of petition is one of the freedoms 
protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly 
impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms,” the Court 
held that the Sherman Act did not apply to the activities of the 
railroads, insofar as they comprised the “mere solicitation of 
governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of 
laws.”36 Moreover, it did not matter that the sole purpose for the 
railroad’s exercise of the right of petition was to destroy the truckers 
as competitors for the long-distance freight business, or that the 
railroads made it appear that its propaganda was being circulated by 
independent groups. The Court noted: 
Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in 
legislating with respect to problems relating to the conduct of 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 129–30. 
 33. Id. at 145. 
 34. Id. at 136. 
 35. Id. at 137. 
 36. Id. at 138. 
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political activities, a caution which has been reflected in the 
decisions of this Court interpreting such legislation. All of this 
caution would go for naught if we permitted an extension of 
the Sherman Act to regulate activities of that nature simply 
because those activities have a commercial impact and involve 
conduct that can be termed unethical.37 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine also immunizes concerted action 
to institute legal and administrative proceedings from antitrust 
liability.38 The Court has made it clear that its interpretation of the 
antitrust laws to provide immunity for the exercise of the right of 
association and petition was influenced by First Amendment 
concerns, and, as a result, it has been unnecessary for the Court to 
decide whether this result is required by the First Amendment itself.39 
 
 37. Id. at 141. 
 38. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). The Court stated:  
We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and petition to hold 
that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use 
the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their 
causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and economic 
interests vis-à-vis their competitors. 
Id. at 510–11. 
 There is a “sham” exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In Noerr Motor, the Court 
stated that “[t]here may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward 
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application 
of the Sherman Act would be justified.” Noerr Motor, 365 U.S. at 144. In California Motor 
Transport, the Court held that the plaintiff had alleged facts that, if true, would come within the 
“sham” exception, such as that the defendants acted “to harass and deter [the plaintiffs] in their 
use of administrative and judicial proceedings, so as to deny them ‘free and unlimited access’ to 
those tribunals.” California Motor, 404 U.S. at 511, 516. In Professional Real Estate Investors, 
Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, the Court held that, with respect to litigation, the “sham” 
exception applied only if the litigation was “objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable 
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits,” and if the baseless lawsuit concealed 
“an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor” through “‘the 
use [of] the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process.’” 508 U.S. 49, 
60–61 (1993) (citations omitted). 
 39. In Claiborne Hardware, the Court discussed the First Amendment concerns expressed 
in Noerr Motor and noted that, like the railroads in Noerr Motor, the organizers of the boycott 
in Claiborne Hardware directly intended that the merchants would sustain economic injury as a 
result of the boycott. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982). It then pointed 
out that, unlike the railroads in Noerr Motor, the purpose of the boycott in Claiborne Hardware 
was not to destroy legitimate competition, but to “vindicate rights of equality and freedom that 
lie at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.” Id. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/7
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D. Home Solicitation 
The First Amendment cannot, however, be used as a sword to 
force access to peoples’ homes for purposes of expression. In 
addition to the property right of homeowners to exclude unwelcome 
entrants, persons also have a First Amendment right not to receive 
unwanted information in the privacy of their homes.40 However, so 
long as the homeowner has not acted affirmatively to exclude the 
 
Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990), the Court held that antitrust immunity did not extend to an 
agreement among District of Columbia lawyers representing indigent defendants to refuse to 
accept new appointments unless the District enacted legislation increasing their compensation. 
The Court held that this was a classic agreement in restraint of trade among competitors, and 
that, unlike Noerr Motor, in which the restraint of trade was the intended consequence of the 
public action, here the boycott was the means by which the lawyers sought to obtain favorable 
legislation. Id. at 424–25. It also rejected the lawyers’ argument, in reliance on Claiborne 
Hardware, that their boycott was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 427 n.10. The 
Claiborne Hardware boycott was designed to advance political objectives for the African-
American residents of the city, while the boycott here was designed to obtain financial benefit 
for the lawyers by a “lessening of competition in the “boycotted market.” Id. at 427 (quoting 
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 508 (1988)). Because the 
boycott here had the economic objective to benefit the participants in the market, rather than the 
political objective recognized in Claiborne Hardware, the Court held that it was not entitled to 
First Amendment protection.  
 40. Thus, a homeowner has the “power to decide ‘whether distributors of literature may 
lawfully call it a home,’” Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943), and Congress 
may protect homeowner privacy by establishing a “do not receive” list of homeowners who do 
not want to receive advertisements for “sexually provocative” material and require mailers to 
remove their names from mailing lists. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 
(1970); see also Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 812 (2004) (upholding against First Amendment challenge the national “do 
not call” registry, which allows individuals to register their phone numbers so that most 
commercial telemarketers are prohibited from calling them). The Mainstream court rejected the 
claim that the law violated First Amendment content neutrality because it did not include 
charitable and political calls in the registry. Id. 
 Because the media enjoy no greater First Amendment rights than the public at large and 
cannot claim exemption from laws of general application on the ground that they are engaged in 
the business of newsgathering, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), the court 
held ABC news liable for the torts of breach of loyalty and trespass when two reporters gained 
access as employees to a food market and videotaped unwholesome food practices. Food Lion, 
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999). However, ABC could not 
be held liable for harm caused to the food market by the videotape in the absence of a showing 
of “malice” under the New York Times standard. Id. at 523–24. 
 In Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999), the Court held that police officers violated 
the Fourth Amendment right of the person whose home was searched when they brought 
newspaper reporters with them to videotape and report the event. The Fourth Amendment 
violation was not obviated by the defendants’ invocation of the First Amendment to justify their 
actions. Id. at 612–13. 
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particular solicitor, or solicitors in general, from approaching the 
home, the First Amendment can be used to effectively challenge 
government efforts to restrict or deny such access in the name of 
protecting homeowner privacy. Indeed, it is precisely because the 
homeowner has the right to exclude unwelcome entrants that there 
almost always will be “less intrusive and more effective measures to 
protect privacy.”41 These laws sometimes take the form of 
prohibitions and sometimes of notice or permit requirements, but, 
beginning with cases brought in the 1940s by Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
whose religion mandates door-to-door canvassing to preach the 
gospel,42 the Court has invariably held that they are unconstitutional 
as applied to religious, political, and charitable speech and 
solicitation.43 An earlier case, decided before the Court held that 
commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection,44 
upheld a ban on commercial solicitation without advance homeowner 
consent against First Amendment challenge.45 If such a case arose 
today, it would be decided in accordance with the commercial speech 
doctrine, and would likely be invalidated as restricting commercial 
 
 41. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980). 
 42. See Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 161 
(2002). 
 43. The most recent case was Watchtower Bible, in which the Court invalidated an 
ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit (given to all who requested it) prior to 
engaging in door-to-door advocacy and to display on demand the permit containing the 
individual’s name. Id. The Court held that the law was not narrowly tailored to advancing the 
asserted interests in protecting homeowner privacy and preventing fraud. Id. at 168; see also 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (considering solicitation permits that were required for 
charitable organizations and given only to those that used at least 75% of their receipts for 
charitable purposes); Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (considering 
an identification permit for canvassing or soliciting from house to house); City of Struthers, 319 
U.S. 141 (considering a ban on door-to-door distribution of handbills, circulars or other 
advertisements); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (considering a permit requirement for 
canvassing, soliciting or distributing circulars from house to house). 
 While a restriction on hours of solicitation could be sustained as a reasonable time, place 
and manner limitation, courts have generally held that the particular restriction does not satisfy 
this test. See, e.g., N.J. Citizen Action v. Edison Twp., 797 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1986); City of 
Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1986), aff’d, 479 U.S. 1048 
(1987); ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 44. The inclusion of commercial speech within the protection of the First Amendment was 
first recognized in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 45. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
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speech more extensively than necessary to advance the asserted 
interest in protecting homeowner privacy.46  
E. “Fair Use” and Copyright Protection 
First Amendment considerations are incorporated into federal 
copyright law, and to this extent the First Amendment limits the 
copyright owner’s ability to use and control his or her copyright. The 
incorporation of First Amendment considerations into copyright law 
is accomplished by provisions of the Copyright Act that prevent the 
copyrighting of ideas or facts47 and that provide the “fair use” 
defense, which enables copyrighted works to be reproduced “for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . 
scholarship, or research.”48 The Court also noted that the Framers 
intended copyright to be an engine of free expression in that, by 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, 
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate 
ideas, and that to allow an owner to copyright a work protects the 
owner’s right to refrain from speaking.49 Thus, the Court took the 
position that, in the context of copyright protection, First Amendment 
concerns are adequately addressed by the built-in safeguards of the 
Copyright Act.50 Further, the Court has not seen it necessary to go 
beyond the built-in safeguards, such as by recognizing a “public 
figure exception to copyright protection”51 or by holding that the First 
 
 46. See Project 80’s, Inc. v. City of Pocatello, 876 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying the 
commercial speech doctrine to invalidate a ban on door-to-door commercial solicitation). 
 47. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 556–57 (1985). 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003); Harper 
& Row, 471 U.S. at 549–55. The fair use exception has been broadly interpreted, as illustrated 
by Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), in which the court 
applied the exception to hold that the copyright of GONE WITH THE WIND was not infringed by 
THE WIND DONE GONE, which effectively rewrote the book in the form of a parody designed to 
“rebut and destroy the perspective, judgments, and mythology” of GONE WITH THE WIND. Id. at 
1270. 
 49. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558–60. 
 50. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 51. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (stating that “we see no warrant for expanding the 
doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright”). 
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Amendment prevents Congress from extending twenty more years of 
protection to existing copyrights.52 
F. Access to Public Property 
”The First Amendment as Sword” is the basis for finding a right 
of access to public property that is not a public forum for purposes of 
expression.53 Under the Court’s public forum doctrine, when public 
property is a traditional54 or designated public forum,55 the public has 
a right of access to that forum, and its use of the forum can be 
regulated only by reasonable and content-neutral time, place and 
manner regulations.56 Most public property, however, is not a public 
forum, and the government frequently wishes to restrict access to that 
property by persons seeking to use it for purposes of expression. The 
Court held that the First Amendment provides some protection for 
expression that takes place on or seeks access to government property 
that is not a public forum.57 The constitutionality of restrictions on 
the use or access to such property is determined by a general 
reasonableness test, which recognizes the government’s entitlement 
to “reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or 
otherwise.”58 This means that, although the government cannot 
impose viewpoint-based restrictions on access to government 
 
 52. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199–217 (dismissing arguments that Congress does not have 
the power to extend copyright protection by twenty years). 
 53. What this means is that the First Amendment is relied on to challenge laws or 
governmental actions that deny or restrict access to such property. See, e.g., Bd. of Airport 
Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (holding unconstitutional an absolute ban 
against “all First Amendment activities” at an airport terminal without regard to whether the 
terminal constituted a public forum). 
 54. Public streets and parks are a traditional public forum. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. 
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939). 
 55. A designated public forum is one that has been established by the government for 
purposes of expression, but the government may take away that designation. The designated 
public forum may be created for a limited purpose, such as for use by certain groups. See 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268–70 (1981); City of Madison v. Wis. Employment 
Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 174–77 (1976). 
 56. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648–50 
(1981). 
 57. See supra note 53. 
 58. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
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property,59 it can impose category-based restrictions so long as they 
are reasonably related to the purpose for which the property is being 
used.60 Applying this standard, the Court held that a school district 
may limit access to the interschool mail system to the exclusive 
bargaining representative of its teachers,61 that the military may 
exclude all partisan political activity from military bases,62 and that 
the federal government may exclude legal defense and political 
advocacy groups from a charity drive aimed at federal employees and 
conducted in a federal workplace during working hours.63 
Once we move beyond these category-based restrictions on access 
to certain kinds of government property, the government must justify 
further restrictions as necessary to reserve the property for its 
intended purposes, and therefore must demonstrate that the particular 
expressive activity seeking access to the property is “basically 
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a 
particular time.”64 This means that, except for permissible category-
based restrictions, the government may not declare the non-public 
forum entirely “off limits” to expression, but may impose reasonable 
restrictions related to preventing interference with the “normal 
activity of a particular place at a particular time.”65 For example, a 
state could prohibit making a speech in the reading room of a public 
library, but could not prohibit a silent vigil in which persons sat on 
 
 59. There are two aspects to the very important First Amendment principle of content 
neutrality: viewpoint neutrality and category neutrality. Under the viewpoint neutrality aspect, 
the government cannot regulate expression in such a way as to favor one viewpoint over 
another. Under the category neutrality aspect, the government cannot regulate in such a way as 
to differentiate between categories of expression. While the Court has recognized no exceptions 
whatsoever to the viewpoint neutrality aspect, it has allowed some limited exceptions to the 
category neutrality aspect. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 466–70. 
 60. See infra notes 61–63 (this is the holding of these three cases). 
 61. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 62. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). 
 63. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
 64. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). 
 65. Id. at 116, 118. In Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), the Court held that the 
state could bar demonstrations in front of a jail and strongly indicated that the state could 
declare the jail off-limits for all expression. Id. at 47–48. In Grayned, the Court noted that the 
holding in Adderley was that “demonstrators could be barred from jailhouse grounds not 
ordinarily open to the public, at least where the demonstration obstructed the jail driveway and 
interfered with the functioning of the jail.” 408 U.S. at 121 n.49. 
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the floor of the reading room to protest the government’s policies.66 
Likewise, a city could prohibit a demonstration on school grounds 
while school is in session, but not after the school day has ended.67 
On the other hand, the Court held that a city may prohibit the posting 
of signs on city property, such as utility poles and lamp posts, to 
prevent “visual clutter,”68 and that the military may generally prohibit 
protest activity at military bases.69 
An expressive activity is most likely to be permissible in a non-
public forum that is physically open, such as an airport terminal. The 
Court held unconstitutional an absolute ban against “all First 
Amendment activities” at an airport terminal70 and a ban on the 
distribution of literature in an airport terminal,71 but upheld a ban on 
the solicitation and receipt of funds in the terminal.72 
 
 66. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 147–49 (1966) (holding that the government 
could not prohibit a silent “sit-in” at a public library to protest its policy of racial segregation). 
 67. In Grayned, the Court upheld an anti-noise ordinance that applied only while school 
was in session and that prohibited the “making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends 
to disturb the peace or good order of such school session.” 408 U.S. at 108. 
 68. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816–17 (1984). 
The Court has held that the Postal Service may prohibit the deposit of unstamped materials in 
letterboxes to ensure that only material on which postage has been paid can be deposited in 
letterboxes. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 126–28 
(1981). 
 69. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). 
 70. Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 570, 577 (1987). 
 71. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 72. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683–85 (1992). 
Where the non-public forum is physically open, such as an airport terminal, the Court’s 
application of the general reasonableness test to the non-public forum does not differ 
significantly from its application of the reasonable time, place, and manner doctrine to the 
public forum. In this case, four Justices held that the interior area of an airport terminal outside 
of the passenger security zones was a public forum for purposes of the public forum doctrine, 
and that neither the ban on distribution of literature nor the ban on solicitation and receipt of 
funds could be sustained as a reasonable time, place and manner regulation. Id. at 693, 704 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor, whose vote provided the fifth vote on all of the 
issues in the case, held that the interior area of an airport terminal did not constitute a public 
forum, and, applying the general reasonableness test, concluded that the ban on distribution was 
not reasonable, but that the ban on solicitation and receipt of funds was. Id. at 685–87, 689, 690 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, one of the four Justices who held that the interior 
area of the airport terminal outside of the passenger security zones was a public forum, upheld 
the ban on solicitation and receipt as a reasonable time, place and manner limitation. Id. at 704 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 Similarly, in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), the Court upheld the Postal 
Service’s ban on solicitation on postal premises, as applied to a sidewalk near the entrance of a 
postal building. Id. at 733, 735, 737. Four Justices held that the postal sidewalk was not a public 
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The Court, applying a general reasonableness test, has held that, in 
certain circumstances, the First Amendment protects the right of 
access to government property that is not a public forum for purposes 
of expression. Unlike private property owners, the government does 
not have full control over its own property, and can only impose 
reasonable restrictions on access of expressive activity to a non-
public forum. 
This portion of the Article has discussed the operation of “The 
First Amendment as Sword.” It demonstrates how the First 
Amendment has been asserted to interfere with a property owner’s 
use or control of tangible property and to limit the protection of an 
owner’s property interest. The fact that the First Amendment can be 
used to significantly interfere with property rights in this manner 
illustrates the strong constitutional protection afforded to freedom of 
expression in the American constitutional system. 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS SHIELD 
We will now discuss how the First Amendment has been asserted 
to invalidate or limit otherwise permissible governmental regulation 
of property ownership or use by enterprises engaged in the “business 
of expression.” The use of the “First Amendment as Shield” arises 
primarily when the government enacts laws that specifically regulate 
enterprises engaged in the business of expression or the expressive 
activity carried on by those businesses. For the most part, enterprises 
engaged in the business of expression cannot claim exemption from 
neutral and generally applicable laws, e.g., a theater owner could not 
assert a First Amendment right to build a theater in an area zoned as 
residential. However, the use of the “First Amendment as Shield” 
may also arise when neutral and generally applicable laws are 
directly applied to expressive activity in such a way as to interfere 
with the activity itself, e.g., the application of a public nudity law to 
prohibit players from appearing nude in theatrical productions. 
 
forum, and that the ban on solicitation could be sustained under the general reasonableness test. 
Id. at 737. A fifth Justice held that the postal sidewalk was a public forum, but concluded that 
the ban on solicitation could be sustained as a reasonable time, place and manner limitation. Id. 
at 737–38 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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A. Regulation of Sexually-Oriented Entertainment 
There are a number of cases involving the constitutional 
permissibility of governmental efforts to regulate sexually-oriented 
entertainment. This should not be surprising. The commercial sex 
industry consists of many businesses featuring sexually-oriented 
entertainment—“adult bookstores,” “adult theaters,” “strip clubs,” 
and the like, and other businesses such as massage parlors, “escort 
services,” and street prostitution. But while there are few legal 
restraints on the government’s ability to prohibit or extensively 
regulate other parts of the commercial sex industry, the First 
Amendment comes into play when the government acts against the 
“sexually-oriented entertainment” part of the industry. Apart from 
anything else, the First Amendment means that the government 
cannot absolutely prohibit “sexually-oriented entertainment,” “nude 
dancing,” or other forms of expression conveying a message of 
sexuality.73 As a constitutional matter, the government can only 
regulate “sexually-oriented entertainment,” and it must do so within 
the constraints of the First Amendment. At the same time, the Court 
has held that the First Amendment permits the government to deal 
with the undesirable secondary effects associated with sexually-
oriented entertainment, so that a state may treat sexually-oriented 
entertainment differently than other types of entertainment by 
imposing regulations directed toward its undesirable secondary 
effects.74 
The Court has held that, because of the undesirable secondary 
effects associated with the operation of sexually-oriented 
entertainment businesses, such as neighborhood deterioration and an 
increased risk of crime, municipalities may enact special zoning 
regulations for sexually-oriented entertainment. These regulations 
 
 73. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–68 (1991) (holding that nude erotic dancing, including striptease 
dancing, is expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amendment, although only at 
the outer limits); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (holding that a ban 
on all live entertainment inside an area zoned commercial violates the First Amendment). 
 74. As a result, restrictions on sexually-oriented entertainment are evaluated under the 
intermediate standard of scrutiny applicable to time, place and manner limitations and the 
symbolic speech doctrine of United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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typically require that sexually-oriented businesses be located at some 
distance from each other and from schools, churches, and residential 
neighborhoods. These regulations are permissible under the First 
Amendment so long as they serve a substantial governmental interest, 
such as preventing neighborhood deterioration, and provide for ample 
alternative avenues of communication.75 
The Court’s decisions in cases involving special zoning 
regulations for sexually-oriented businesses have shaped the 
development of the constitutional doctrine applicable to all 
regulations of sexually-oriented businesses. The key elements in 
determining the constitutional permissibility of such regulations are: 
(1) undesirable secondary effects; and (2) ample alternative avenues 
of communication.76 
The Court has given the government broad latitude in finding 
undesirable secondary effects to justify a particular regulation, such 
as a requirement that female dancers wear “pasties” and “G-strings”77 
or a prohibition against locating more than one sexually oriented 
business in the same building.78 At the same time, in every case in 
which the Court upheld a regulation of sexually-oriented 
entertainment, it held that the regulation provided ample alternative 
avenues of communication and, as in the “pasties” and “G-strings” 
cases, that the regulation did not interfere with the message of 
sexuality conveyed by the nearly-nude dancers. The point is that 
while the government can regulate sexually-oriented entertainment to 
advance its asserted interest in preventing undesirable secondary 
effects, the First Amendment protects the message of erotica 
conveyed by sexually-oriented entertainment and ensures that such 
entertainment will continue to take place.79 
 
 75. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am. 
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).  
 76. See Young, 427 U.S. 50 (setting forth these elements). 
 77. City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277; Barnes, 501 U.S. 560. In the context of undesirable 
secondary effects associated with completely nude dancing, the cities asserted an increase in 
crime, prostitution, sexual activity, and sexually transmitted diseases. See, e.g., City of Erie, 529 
U.S. at 297–98. 
 78. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002). The Court also held that 
the city could reasonably rely on a 1977 study showing that a ban on the concentration of 
sexually-oriented businesses in a particular neighborhood would reduce crime. Id. at 436. 
 79. The subtext of the litigation with regard to the regulation of sexually-oriented 
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B. Licensing of the Business of Expression 
Any system of governmental licensing of expression analytically 
involves a prior restraint, and the Court has dealt with such licensing 
by imposing specific requirements.80 As a general proposition, any 
law licensing expression must be content-neutral and must contain 
narrow, objective and definite standards that control the discretion of 
the licensing official.81 If the law fails to contain such standards, it is 
invalidated “on its face,” and a party subject to the law is not required 
to apply for a license as a condition to challenging its 
 
entertainment is the economic impact of the regulation. The owners of businesses featuring 
sexually-oriented entertainment are in the “business of expression” to make money, in the same 
manner as newspapers or television stations. The goal of the government regulators is to impair 
the economic viability of the sexually-oriented businesses in the hope that they will close down. 
So, special zoning for sexually-oriented entertainment is likely to attempt to minimize the 
desirable locations available for sexually-oriented entertainment.  
 The government may impose a host of other restrictions that affect the economic viability 
of sexually-oriented entertainment, but that do not violate the First Amendment because they do 
not interfere with the expression of sexuality. In analyzing restrictions on nude dancing that 
have been upheld by lower federal courts and that are consistent with applicable Supreme Court 
doctrine, I concluded: 
What has emerged from the extensive litigation over governmental regulation of nude 
dancing is that the Supreme Court and lower court decisions have effectively separated 
the communicative erotic message conveyed by nude dancing from the undesirable 
secondary effects associated with the operation of adult entertainment establishments 
featuring nude dancing. They have separated this communicative message, protected 
by the First Amendment, from the commercial sex industry, of which nude dancing is 
a part. The states may not prohibit nude dancing in adult entertainment establishments. 
However, they may regulate it extensively in order to combat undesirable secondary 
effects. They may require that the dancers wear a minimal amount of clothing, 
represented by a ‘g-strings’ and ‘pasties’ requirement, but they may not otherwise 
prevent the dancers from appearing nude. They may prohibit nude dancing in adult 
entertainment establishments that serve alcohol, but must permit nude dancing in adult 
entertainment establishments that do not. They may prohibit any sexual contact 
between the dancers and their customers and may require that there be a buffer zone 
between them, but subject to these restrictions, the dancers must be able to perform 
table dances. In the final analysis, the First Amendment protects the core message of 
sexuality and eroticism conveyed by nude dancing, and thus advances the underlying 
purpose of this fundamental constitutional guarantee. 
Robert A. Sedler, Nude Dancing, in PROTECTING FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION: THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AND LAND USE LAW 195, 206 (Daniel R. Mandelker & Rebecca L. Rubin eds., 
2001). 
 80. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
 81. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757–59 (1988). 
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constitutionality.82 In addition, the Court has held that the First 
Amendment imposes procedural requirements on the operation of 
licensing systems, which are designed to ensure that expression will 
not be delayed or “chilled” due to the licensing requirement. These 
procedural requirements were first imposed by Freedman v. 
Maryland,83 in the context of challenges to state systems of motion 
picture censorship. The Court held that the following three safeguards 
are necessary to ensure expeditious decision-making by the 
censorship board: (1) Any restraint can be imposed prior to judicial 
review only for a specified brief period of time in which the status 
quo must be maintained; (2) Expeditious judicial review of that 
decision must be available; and (3) The censor must bear the burden 
of going to court to suppress the speech and must bear the burden of 
proof once in court.84 
In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,85 the Court held that the first 
two Freedman requirements applied to a city’s licensing of sexually-
oriented businesses, but that the third did not. Justice O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion, which represents the holding of the Court on this 
issue,86 noted that the first two requirements were essential to protect 
First Amendment interests in the licensing context “because undue 
 
 82. See Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Staub v. City of 
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Lovell, 303 U.S. 444. The First Amendment requirements are the 
same for parade permits and other laws that in effect require a license for access to public 
property. 
 83. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
 84. Id. at 58–59. The Freedman standards apply to customs seizures of allegedly obscene 
materials, United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), and to pretrial 
seizures of allegedly obscene materials in RICO prosecutions, Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. 
Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989). 
 See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding that North Carolina’s 
licensing scheme violated the First Amendment because it required that fundraisers obtain a 
license before soliciting but did not require that the licensing official either issue the license 
within a specified brief period of time or go to court). 
 85. 493 U.S. 215, 217–18 (1990). 
 86. This was the position of a three-Justice plurality in an opinion authored by Justice 
O’Connor. Three other Justices took the position that all three Freedman requirements should 
apply, while three Justices took the position that the Freedman requirements did not apply to 
the licensing of sexually-oriented businesses. The O’Connor plurality opinion constitutes the 
holding of the Court as the narrowest ground of agreement among the Justices who concurred in 
the judgment. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating that the narrowest 
ground of agreement among the Justices who concurred in the judgment is the holding of a 
case). 
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delay results in the unconstitutional suppression of protected 
speech.”87 However, the opinion went on to draw a distinction 
between a censorship scheme, in which the censor makes judgments 
about expressive material, and a licensing scheme, in which the city 
only reviews the general qualifications of each applicant and in which 
the applicant has every incentive to pursue a license denial with the 
courts.88 In any event, as a result of FW/PBS, it is now settled that the 
first two Freedman requirements, but not the third, apply to the 
licensing of sexually-oriented businesses.89 
It is clear that the First Amendment provides a high degree of 
protection to those engaged in the business of expression when the 
state requires that they obtain a license to do so. The licensing law 
must be content-neutral and must contain narrow, objective and 
definite standards that control the discretion of the licensing 
official.90 In addition, the First Amendment imposes procedural 
requirements on the operation of licensing systems, which are 
designed to ensure that expression will not be delayed due to the 
licensing scheme. In recent years, the licensing of expression has 
been, for the most part, directed against sexually-oriented 
entertainment businesses, and the operators of these businesses have 
been able to use the First Amendment to limit the impact of these 
licensing laws. 
 
 87. FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 228. 
 88. Id. at 229–30. 
 89. In City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, Inc., 541 U.S. 774 (2004), the Court held that 
when a licensing of sexually-oriented business ordinance had neutral and objective standards, 
set forth time limits typically amounting to forty days in which city officials had to make the 
licensing decision, and provided that the final decision could be appealed to the state courts in 
accordance with the state rules of civil procedure, it was not necessary that the ordinance itself 
ensure a “prompt judicial decision.” Id. at 780–81. Rather, the Court would assume that the 
state’s ordinary judicial review procedures, which included provisions for accelerated action, 
would avoid delay-induced harm to First Amendment interests. Id. at 782. 
 In City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278 (2001), the Court indicated 
that the requirement of prompt judicial review might not be necessary to protect the First 
Amendment rights of a party seeking to renew a license to operate a sexually-oriented business. 
Id. at 285–86. Rather, the First Amendment issue in this situation would depend on the 
availability of a stay during the process of judicial review. Id. at 285. 
 90. See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
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C. Billboard and Sign Regulation 
There have been two cases before the Supreme Court involving 
the First Amendment rights of homeowners to display signs in front 
of their homes, and in both cases the Court upheld these First 
Amendment rights. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of 
Willingboro,91 the Court held that a city ordinance that prohibited 
“for sale” signs in front of homes violated the First Amendment. The 
city’s stated purpose for the ordinance was to prevent “white flight” 
by homeowners from a racially integrated community.92 Applying the 
commercial speech doctrine, the Court held that the asserted interest 
was constitutionally improper because it was based on the content of 
the information and proceeded on the premise that the state could 
deny individuals access to truthful information because of how they 
might make use of it.93 
In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,94 a city ordinance prohibited 
homeowners from displaying any signs on their property, except for 
residence identification signs, “for sale” signs, and signs warning of 
safety hazards. The ordinance also permitted commercial signs in 
commercially or industrially zoned districts.95 The effect of the 
ordinance was to prohibit most signs on a homeowner’s property, to 
allow some signs, but not others, based on their content, and to treat 
commercial speech more favorably than non-commercial speech.96 
 
 91. 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977). 
 92. Id. at 88. 
 93. Id. at 96–97. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the seminal case extending First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech, the Court held unconstitutional a ban on advertising the prices of 
prescription drugs, noting that the state’s justification for the ban “rests in large measure on the 
advantages of [its citizens] being kept in ignorance.” Id. at 769–70. The Court further stated that 
“[i]t is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the 
dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.” Id. at 
770. The Court repeated this language in Willingboro. 431 U.S. at 97. 
 The Court in Willingboro indicated that the state could impose reasonable and content 
neutral time, place and manner limitations on the use of signs to advance aesthetic interests, 
such as regulating the size and number of the signs. Id. at 97–98. Lower federal courts have 
upheld some of these restrictions. See, e.g., Am. Legion Post 7 v. City of Durham, 239 F.3d 601 
(4th Cir. 2001); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 94. 512 U.S. 43, 45 (1994). 
 95. Id. at 46. 
 96. Id. at 45–47, 54. 
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While the lower court based its decision on the content discrimination 
rationale, the Supreme Court went further and held that the city’s 
near total prohibition of residential signs was unconstitutional.97 The 
effect of the decision was to recognize a homeowner’s First 
Amendment right to display commercial or non-commercial signs on 
his or her property, subject only to the government’s ability to impose 
reasonable time, place and manner limitations on the display.98 
Billboard regulation came before the Court in Metromedia, Inc. v. 
City of San Diego,99 in the form of an ordinance that prohibited all 
billboards, except for on-site commercial billboards designating the 
business’ name or advertising its products or services and some non-
commercial billboards, such as government signs, religious symbols, 
and temporary political campaign signs. The city asserted an interest 
in promoting traffic safety by preventing distraction of motorists and 
in advancing aesthetics by improving the appearance of the city.100 
The Court was highly fragmented, but two holdings emerged from 
the decision. First, the Court held that the city could ban all 
commercial billboards, and could also distinguish between categories 
of commercial speech by making an exception for on-site commercial 
billboards.101 Second, the Court held that the ban on billboards was 
 
 97. Id. at 54. The Court referred to residential signs as “a venerable means of 
communication that is both unique and important.” Id. The Court went on to note: 
Signs that react to a local happening or express a view on a controversial issue both 
reflect and animate change in the life of a community. Often placed on lawns or in 
windows, residential signs play an important part in particular campaigns, during 
which they are displayed to signal the resident’s support for political candidates, 
parties, or causes. They may not afford the same opportunities for conveying complex 
ideas as do other media, but residential signs have long been an important and distinct 
medium of expression. 
Id. at 54–55. 
 98. Cities have tried to limit the display of political signs to a stated period before and to 
require removal in a stated period after an election. Lower federal courts and state courts have 
consistently held these durational limits on political signs to be violative of the First 
Amendment. See, e.g., Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400 (8th Cir. 1995); Collier v. 
City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046 (Wash. 1993). 
 99. 453 U.S. 490, 490 (1981). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 513. The four-Justice plurality opinion of Justices White, Stewart, Marshall, and 
Powell took this position, id. at 513, and Justice Stevens agreed with this position as well, id. at 
541–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger would have 
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unconstitutional as applied to non-commercial speech.102 Four 
Justices found this provision unconstitutional because it allowed 
commercial billboards in certain locations in which non-commercial 
billboards were not, thus favoring commercial speech over non-
commercial speech, and because it allowed some non-commercial 
billboards, but not others, thereby violating content neutrality.103 In 
addition to the two Justices who found the entire ban 
unconstitutional, there were six votes for holding the ban 
unconstitutional as applied to non-commercial billboards.104 As a 
result of Metromedia, a state can ban all or some commercial 
billboards. Left unanswered is the question, unlikely to arise in 
practice, of whether a state can ban all billboards, both non-
commercial and commercial, with no exceptions. 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly,105 which invalidated location prohibitions and point-of-sale 
restrictions on tobacco advertising directed at children, is another 
example of the use of the First Amendment as a shield to protect 
property rights.106 In Lorillard, the Court invalidated both the 
location prohibitions and the point-of-sale restrictions under the 
commercial speech doctrine.107 It held that the location prohibitions 
were more extensive than necessary to advance the state’s interest in 
preventing underage tobacco use, and that the on-site advertising 
regulation did not directly advance the state’s asserted interest in 
preventing underage tobacco use and, further, was more restrictive 
than necessary to advance this interest.108 The effect of Lorillard was 
to protect the property interests of tobacco manufacturers and 
 
upheld the ban in its entirety; this holding was therefore supported by seven Justices. Id. at 569–
70 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 521. 
 103. Id. at 513. This was the position of the four-Justice plurality. 
 104. This was the position of Justices Brennan and Blackmun, who would have found the 
ban unconstitutional in its entirety. Id. at 534 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 105. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 106. The First Amendment analysis applied to the ban on smokeless tobacco and cigar 
advertising. The Court held that the ban on cigarette advertising was preempted by federal law. 
Id. at 550. 
 107. Id. at 565–66. 
 108. Id. 
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retailers in promoting the sale of tobacco and of billboard owners in 
obtaining this source of advertising revenue. 
D. Illegal Conduct and the Business of Expression 
It would not be expected that the First Amendment would protect 
illegal conduct by those engaged in the business of expression, and, 
as a general rule, it does not. The rationale here is that what is 
regulated is the illegal conduct, and it is irrelevant that such conduct 
took place in connection with the business of expression. This being 
so, it is unnecessary for the government to justify the prohibition 
under a First Amendment analysis. Thus, a nuisance abatement law 
providing for the forced closure of a building used for purposes of 
“lewdness, assignation, or prostitution” may be applied to force the 
closure of a building used as an adult book store, following a finding 
that the prohibited activities took place in that building.109 Similarly, 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)110 
may be applied to forfeit the assets of an owner of stores and theaters 
dealing in sexually explicit materials upon a conviction for selling 
obscene materials at several of these stores.111 
The First Amendment can be used as a shield in this context 
because it precludes the government, in an effort to prevent illegal 
conduct, from taking action that would have a chilling effect against 
constitutionally-protected expression. The government can avoid this 
problem by focusing its action on the illegal conduct and by 
separating that conduct from protected expression. Thus, a court can 
issue an injunction against the dissemination of material determined 
 
 109. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706–07 (1986). Because it is not necessary 
for the government to justify the prohibition under a First Amendment analysis, it is irrelevant 
that the closure order may have gone further than was necessary to prevent the illegal conduct. 
Id. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals held that the closure order interfered with the 
free speech rights of the operator of the bookstore, and, in the absence of a showing that the 
closure order was no broader than necessary to prevent the illegal conduct from occurring, the 
order violated the free speech provision of the State Constitution. People ex rel Acara v. Cloud 
Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 558–59 (N.Y. 1986). 
 110. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000). 
 111. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 556–58 (1993). Four Justices (Kennedy, 
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter) took the position that the First Amendment precluded the 
forfeiture of books and movies not determined to be obscene. Id. at 575–76 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
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to be obscene in an adversarial proceeding. This is because once there 
has been a judicial determination of obscenity, the material is no 
longer protected speech and the First Amendment no longer 
precludes the issuance of an injunction against its dissemination.112 
Likewise, because sex-designated “help-wanted” ads have been held 
to be a form of illegal sex discrimination, the First Amendment does 
not preclude an injunction against a newspaper carrying such ads.113 
However, an injunction prohibiting a theater showing obscene films 
in the future, based on its past showing of obscene films, is an 
unconstitutional prior restraint.114 Unless and until there has been a 
judicial determination that particular films are obscene, the showing 
of these films is protected by the First Amendment.115 An injunction 
prohibiting the showing of obscene films in the future could have a 
chilling effect on protected expression, in that the theater owner may 
be deterred from showing certain sexually explicit films for fear that 
they might subsequently be found to be obscene.116 For the same 
reason, a government commission cannot make a list of 
“objectionable” books and threaten distributors with possible 
obscenity prosecutions if they continue to distribute these books.117 
E. Regulation of Newspapers and Publishers 
Newspapers and publishers have successfully used the First 
Amendment as a shield to prevent the government from placing 
burdens on the operation of their businesses. The Court invalidated, 
as violative of the First Amendment, a “right to reply” law, which 
required any newspaper that attacked the personal character or 
official record of a candidate for public office to provide the 
candidate with equal space in the newspaper to reply to the attack.118 
The Court reasoned that the “right to reply” requirement could have a 
 
 112. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). 
 113. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 
(1973). 
 114. See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
 118. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–58 (1974). 
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chilling effect on a newspaper’s discussion of candidates and public 
issues.119 The Court also held unconstitutional state efforts to impose 
special taxes on newspapers, such as a use tax on the cost of paper 
and ink products consumed in the production of a publication, as well 
as exemptions limiting the effects of these efforts to only a few 
newspapers.120 The Court further held unconstitutional a state’s 
imposition of a sales tax on the sale of magazines, with an exemption 
only for religious, professional, trade and sports periodicals.121 
Finally, the Court held unconstitutional a state law requiring that the 
proceeds from a book written by an accused or convicted criminal 
about a crime be used to compensate the victim, on the grounds that 
the law did not provide for compensation to the victim from the 
criminal’s other assets.122 The effect of this law was to discriminate 
against expression in favor of non-expression, and to provide a 
disincentive to publishers to publish work with a particular content.123 
F. Regulation of Broadcasting, Cable and the Internet 
Broadcasters have been unable to assert the First Amendment as a 
shield against governmental regulation because the Supreme Court 
has held that governmental regulation of broadcasting can proceed on 
the assumption of “public ownership of the airwaves” and that the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) can require that 
broadcasters operate “in the public interest.”124 It was on this basis 
that the Court upheld against First Amendment challenge the now-
repealed “fairness doctrine,” which required that broadcasters provide 
a balanced presentation of viewpoints, allocate a reasonable 
percentage of broadcast time for public issues, and allow an 
opportunity to respond to a “personal attack” and to present an 
editorial endorsement of a political opponent.125 The Court also held 
 
 119. Id. at 257. 
 120. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591–93 
(1983). 
 121. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 233–34 (1987). 
 122. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 116–17, 123 (1991). 
 123. Id. at 121–23. 
 124. See infra notes 125–27 and accompanying text. 
 125. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969). 
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that Congress may constitutionally provide that candidates for federal 
office have a legally enforceable right to purchase a reasonable 
amount of broadcast time.126 Further, the Court held that the FCC 
may impose certain limited restrictions on programming that may be 
objectionable to children during the time of day when children are 
likely to be listening.127 Nonetheless, the First Amendment does 
apply to governmental regulation of broadcasting, and certain 
broadcasting regulations may be violative of the First Amendment, 
such as a complete ban on editorializing by public broadcasting 
stations that receive grants from the federal government.128 Given 
that the FCC is now lessening its control over broadcasting, issues 
involving the First Amendment rights of broadcasters are less likely 
to arise in the near future. 
The advent of cable television and its regulation by the federal 
government and by municipalities has given rise to a number of First 
Amendment questions that cannot be fit neatly into the doctrines that 
the Court has developed to deal with broadcast regulation. 
Conventional cablecasting involves placing cable wires under streets 
or on municipally-owned utility poles, and municipalities generally 
enter into franchise agreements with a particular cable operator, 
thereby giving the operator an effective monopoly on conventional 
cablecasting within the municipality. These agreements typically 
require the cable operator to reserve some channels for public, 
educational and governmental access (PEGs). 
 
 126. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
 127. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 128. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). In CBS, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the television network refused to accept 
any public issue advertising. Id. at 98. Parties seeking to purchase such advertising challenged 
the ban, and the Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional requirement that the 
network accept such advertising. Id. at 130–32. While conceding that the television network 
was not a state actor for constitutional purposes, the Democratic National Committee contended 
that the First Amendment imposed an obligation on the FCC to make the airwaves open for 
such advertising. Id. at 98. The contrary contention was that for the FCC to require the networks 
accept such advertising would itself violate the networks’ First Amendment rights. Id. at 94–95. 
While the Court did not decide the latter issue, it indicated that the First Amendment did not 
impose an obligation on the FCC to require broadcasters to accept public issue advertising. Id. 
at 119–21. The Court indicated that the networks had a First Amendment right to exercise a 
degree of editorial discretion over their programming. Id. 
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Congress was concerned about the monopolistic character of 
cablecasting in most municipalities, and, in the Cable Television and 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the “1992 Act” 
or the “Act”),129 required cable operators to devote a portion of their 
channels to programs of local broadcasters. A sharply divided Court 
upheld the constitutionality of these “must-carry” provisions, over 
objections by the cable operators that such provisions violated their 
First Amendment rights.130 
Federal law generally prevents cable operators from exercising 
any editorial control over the content of leased-access or public-
access channels. The 1992 Act, however, permitted cable operators to 
prohibit the broadcast of material on leased-access and public-access 
channels that the operator “reasonably believes describes or depicts 
sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive 
manner.”131 The Act further provided that, if the cable operator did 
not prohibit such material from being broadcast, it must provide a 
separate channel for the material, scramble or otherwise block its 
presentation, and permit its viewing only upon written request of a 
subscriber.132 Congress also imposed these “segregate and block” 
requirements on channels primarily dedicated to sexual programming 
and required cable operators to honor a subscriber’s request to block 
any undesired programs.133 
In what turned out to be a clear victory for the cable operators, a 
sharply divided Court upheld the Act’s provision granting the cable 
operators the authority to prohibit sexual programming on leased-
access and public-access channels, but held that its “segregate and 
 
 129. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 
U.S.C.). 
 130. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). The majority took the position 
that it was appropriate in this area for the Court to defer to congressional judgment, so long as 
Congress “ha[d] drawn reasonable inferences based upon substantial evidence.” Id. at 195. The 
majority held that the legislation was narrowly tailored to preserve the benefits of local 
broadcast television, to promote widespread dissemination from a multiplicity of sources, and 
to promote fair competition. Id. at 189–90, 224–25. The dissenting Justices contended that the 
record did not support the conclusion that cable television posed a significant threat to local 
broadcast markets or that the law was narrowly tailored to deal with anti-competitive conduct. 
Id. at 257–58 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 131. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (2000). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. § 532(h)–(j), app. § 531. 
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block” requirements violated the cable operators’ First Amendment 
rights.134 In another victory for cable operators, the Court, again 
sharply divided, held unconstitutional a federal law requiring that 
cable operators who provided channels primarily dedicated to 
sexually-oriented programming either completely block these 
channels so that non-subscribers would be unable to see or hear them 
or, if they could not completely block these channels, that they 
operate them only between the hours of 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M., 
when children were unlikely to be viewing.135 The Court majority 
held that this law was content-based, with a serious impact on 
protected speech, and that there was available the less restrictive 
alternative of allowing an individual subscriber to request that the 
channel be blocked.136 
Congress’ efforts to prevent minors from receiving sexually-
oriented material over the internet have foundered on the rock of the 
First Amendment. In the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 
Congress prohibited transmitting indecent messages to any recipient 
under eighteen years of age137 and knowingly sending or displaying 
patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to persons 
under eighteen years of age.138 The Court invalidated both of these 
provisions as too vague and too broad to withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny.139 In the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), Congress 
prohibited knowingly posting for commercial purposes material 
harmful to minors, which was essentially defined as material that was 
obscene for minors.140 In a five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the 
grant of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of this law on 
the ground that it probably violated the First Amendment because 
there were less restrictive alternatives available to protect children, 
such as filtering software at the receiving end.141 
 
 134. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
 135. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
 136. Id. 
 137. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2000). 
 138. Id. § 223(d). 
 139. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 140. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (2000). 
 141. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has analyzed the impact of the First Amendment’s 
free speech guarantee on the use, enjoyment and control of property. 
A review of Supreme Court decisions in this area demonstrates that 
the impact has been quite significant. The discussion of “The First 
Amendment as Sword” has shown that the First Amendment has been 
asserted effectively to interfere with a property owner’s use or control 
of tangible property and to limit the protection of an owner’s property 
interests. The discussion of “The First Amendment as Shield” has 
shown that the First Amendment has been asserted effectively to 
invalidate or limit otherwise permissible governmental regulation of 
property ownership or use by enterprises engaged in the business of 
expression. 
The effective assertion of the First Amendment on the one hand as 
“sword,” and on the other hand as “shield,” demonstrates most 
cogently the high degree of protection afforded to freedom of 
expression by the American constitutional system. With the First 
Amendment as “sword,” property rights are subordinated to First 
Amendment rights; with the First Amendment as “shield,” enterprises 
engaged in the business of expression can invalidate or limit 
otherwise permissible regulation of property ownership or use. This 
Article has explained how the strong constitutional protection 
afforded to freedom of expression in the American constitutional 
system is reflected in the “law of the First Amendment,” and has 
demonstrated by a review of cases that the application of the “law of 
the First Amendment” to questions of property and speech has 
continued on the same course during the years of the Rehnquist 
Court. During this era, as it has at least since the 1960s, the Court as 
an institution has demonstrated a strong commitment to the 
constitutional protection of freedom of expression, and this 
commitment has been evident in the Court’s decisions in the area of 
property and speech. 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/7
